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Debates over the implications of China’s rise for global governance have reached an impasse, 
since evidence exists to support both ‘revisionist’ and ‘status-quo’ intentions. This means that 
neither is strictly falsifiable and hence the debate, as currently structured, is irresolvable. 
However, contradictions are explicable if we recognise that China is not a unitary state. Since 
the beginning of the reform era, its international engagements have been shaped by the uneven 
transformation – fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation – of state apparatuses. 
Contradictory international actions thus may reflect not top-down strategic direction, but 
conflicts, disagreements and coordination problems within China’s transformed party-state. 
Our state transformation approach directs us away from evaluating China’s approach to global 
governance in toto – whether it is overall a revisionist or status quo power – towards a detailed 
analysis of particular policy domains. This is because in each issue-area we find different 
constellations of actors and interests, and varying degrees of party-state transformation. We 
 2 
demonstrate the centrality of state transformation analysis for explaining the co-existence of 
revisionist and status quo behaviours through the apparently hard test-case of nuclear 
technologies. Even in this ‘high politics’ domain, state transformation dynamics help explain 
China’s inconsistent international behaviours.  
 
Introduction 
International Relations (IR) scholars are hotly debating the implications of China’s rise for the 
international order. Two main positions are evident: some view China as a revisionist power 
seeking to overturn the United States-led liberal world order and construct an alternative in 
China’s authoritarian, state-capitalist image, through both peaceful and violent means; others 
portray China as a status-quo power that will broadly preserve the liberal world order that has 
benefited it.  
The subfield of global governance hosts a significant share of this debate. After decades 
of disengagement or low-profile, China has become an increasingly active participant in global 
governance institutions. However, some observers accuse China and other rising powers of 
causing gridlock in global governance institutions to undermine traditional powers (Hale et al., 
2013). China has also constructed new international institutions, most notably the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank. Again, some see a 
revisionist China establishing institutions to rival established ones (Paradise, 2016; Beeson and 
Li, 2016), while others note their similarity to extant institutions (Chin, 2016; Wilson, 2017). 
 The present impasse in this debate reflects the fact that evidence exists for both 
positions (Goldstein, 2007). For example, on the one hand, China has signed the United Nations 
Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) and incorporated it into domestic law; on the 
other, Beijing rejected the jurisdiction of a special tribunal in The Hague, established under 
UNCLOS, to examine the Philippines’ challenge to Chinese territorial claims in the South 
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China Sea. And, in practice, there is evidence for both Chinese compliance with, and rejection 
of, the tribunal’s ruling. To give another example, although the AIIB closely resembles other 
multilateral development banks, other forms of Chinese development financing clearly diverge 
from, and weaken, global norms (Hameiri & Jones, 2018). The availability of evidence 
supporting both ‘revisionist’ and ‘status-quo’ perspectives means neither is strictly falsifiable 
and hence the debate, as currently structured, is irresolvable. It has also become highly 
speculative, reflecting less what China is actually doing than what observers think it will do or 
become in the future (Breslin, 2009; 2017), which ultimately reflects the basic expectations 
arising from scholars’ preferred theoretical models. Those who expect China to be revisionist 
explain away inconsistent behaviour as only a temporary accommodation with the status-quo 
(China is merely ‘biding its time’). Those who expect China to be a status-quo power argue 
that apparent revisionism only reflects manoeuvres to improve China’s position within the 
existing order.  
We aim to break this impasse and explain the sources and implications of China’s 
apparently incoherent engagement in global governance with an approach that can explain – 
rather than explain away – the evidence on both sides of the existing debate. The main problem 
is that IR studies of rising powers, notably China, tend to treat states as unitary actors. China’s 
authoritarian, apparently hierarchical, party-state reinforces this perception. Thus, both status-
quo and revisionist perspectives concur that China’s international actions reflect strategic 
calculation by a coherent national leadership. They only disagree on what policy outcomes this 
calculation entails. It is difficult to explain contradictory actions from this vantage point.  
  However, contradictions are explicable if we recognise that, just like any other state, 
China is not a unitary actor. Since the beginning of the reform era, its international engagements 
have been shaped by the uneven transformation – fragmentation, decentralisation and 
internationalisation – of state apparatuses (Hameiri & Jones, 2016). Subject to ongoing 
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piecemeal restructuring, central state agencies have reduced in size, and decision-making 
authority has become fragmented, overlapping and incoherent. Multiple central party and state 
bodies are responsible for the same policy domain, often with limited direct authority over 
implementing agencies. Many large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been consolidated 
and ‘corporatised’ – remaining formally state-owned, but now largely autonomous, self-
financing capitalist enterprises. Considerable authority has also been devolved to sub-national 
governments to facilitate pro-market experimentation and development, over time generating 
‘de facto federalism’ (Zheng, 2007), associated with extensive centre-local bargaining 
throughout the policy formation and implementation process. Party-state apparatuses have 
often also internationalised, as formerly domestic agencies have increasingly acquired 
international roles, typically with limited central oversight: provincial governments now 
control their foreign economic relations, signing international treaties to promote local 
economic interests; SOEs have been encouraged to ‘go out’, becoming major global actors; 
regulators have joined transnational regulatory bodies and law enforcement agencies have 
internationalised to manage transnational security problems like piracy and narcotics.  
  In this evolving ‘Chinese-style regulatory state’ (Jones, 2018), central party-state 
managers usually do not control outcomes directly but mainly use various disciplinary and 
positive mechanisms to ‘steer’ other actors. However, the centre’s will and capacity to 
coordinate and/or regulate the actors implementing China’s international engagements varies, 
and is often limited. This means that contradictory international actions may reflect not 
strategic direction from the top, but conflicts, disagreements and coordination problems within 
China’s fragmented, decentralised and unevenly internationalised party-state. Nonetheless, 
because outsiders read strategic intentionality into these actions, the risk of misunderstanding 
and international conflict is significant.  
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The ‘state transformation’ approach we adopt directs us away from evaluating China’s 
approach to global governance in toto – whether it is overall a revisionist or status quo power 
– towards a detailed analysis of particular policy domains. This is because in each issue-area 
we find different constellations of actors and interests, and varying degrees of party-state 
transformation. Naturally, where multiple actors are involved in policymaking and 
implementation; where conflict is significant over policy aims and how to attain them; and 
where policymaking actors have limited capacity to ensure faithful implementation by 
implementing agencies; it is likely that international behaviour will be inconsistent, even 
contradictory.  
To demonstrate our core contention in this paper that state transformation analysis helps 
explain inconsistent international behaviours, we have selected the apparently hard test-case of 
nuclear technologies. Arguably, as China is a nuclear weapons state, no other area of policy 
should demonstrate a weaker influence of state transformation dynamics. This is a 
quintessential ‘hard’ security and ‘high politics’ domain, where IR theory would 
conventionally lead us to expect limited dynamics of fragmentation, and centralised top-down 
control over all aspects of policymaking and implementation (e.g. Keohane & Nye 2012). Yet, 
we have found that even in this case state transformation has played a key role in explaining 
policy outcomes.  
Originally centralised controls have over time morphed into a more diffuse governance 
arrangement. Internal struggles and diverging interests among the Chinese actors active in this 
domain have produced inconsistent Chinese engagements in global nuclear governance, 
oscillating between ‘revisionist’ and ‘status-quo’ behaviours. For example, while China has 
become increasingly willing to commit itself to nuclear non-proliferation treaties, its nuclear 
cooperation with countries such as Iran and Pakistan, led by its defence and energy industries, 
has been undermining the credibility of its promise. Those behaviours are not necessarily a 
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result of strategic calculation, seeking a revisionist or status quo outcome, but rather the product 
of conflicts and coordination problems within a fragmented party-state apparatus. Our findings 
chime with several works in the nuclear studies literature that show that in many states, the 
fragmentation of policymaking and implementation processes has led to inconsistent 
international behaviour (Sagan, 1996; Hymans, 2012; Freedman, 1989). However, that these 
insights have not led to any significant revision of the main IR frameworks, only reinforces our 
argument in this paper for a state transformation approach.   
We begin by briefly describing the IR debate over China’s engagement in global 
governance. We then proceed to elaborate the state transformation approach we use before 
providing an in-depth analysis of the role state transformation has played in shaping China’s 
engagement in the global governance of nuclear weapons.  
 
Existing perspectives on China and global governance 
Global governance is a contested concept with wide ranging scholarly and practical usages. In 
its broadest meaning, it refers to the processes and mechanism emerging to govern cross-border 
relations, flows and challenges (Coen & Pegram, 2018; Hameiri & Jones, 2015). In a narrower 
sense, more prevalent in popular and academic writing, it refers to the formal, often state-based, 
institutions – whether organisations or treaties – established to manage global public ‘goods’ 
and ‘bads’. The number and scope of such international institutions has undoubtedly grown 
since the end of World War II and especially from the 1980s onwards, as economic 
globalisation had deepened and intensified. Liberal institutionalist scholars often assume that 
as states develop shared interests, resulting from deepening economic integration and 
cooperation, they would delegate authority to supranational institutions that can overcome 
problems of asymmetric information and collective action (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997). 
This expectation has often failed to materialise and global governance is now typically seen as 
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in crisis and in a state of ‘gridlock’ (Hale, Held, & Young, 2013). Rising powers, especially 
China, are often blamed for this situation (Patrick 2010; Mead 2014; Haggard 2014), though 
after the election of Donald Trump to the US Presidency it is unclear whether the US is 
committed to maintaining the so-called ‘liberal international order’ either (Beeson & Zeng, 
2018).   
 Until the 1970s, the People’s Republic of China (China) was almost entirely cut off 
from international institutions. In the early 1970s, China joined the UN system, but remained 
relatively inactive for the following 25 or so years. It was only much more recently that China 
began taking an active interest in existing global governance institutions, as well as establishing 
new ones (Shambaugh, 2013, p. 125; Loke, 2017). This general trend manifests in China’s 
participation in the institutions established to govern nuclear technologies as well. It was not 
until the early 1990s that China changed its passive and partial participation and started to 
embrace the global nuclear treaties, of which it was highly critical before.  
As with the wider debate over China’s rise, scholars have looked at its growing 
involvement in global governance and asked whether its behaviour indicated it was a 
‘revisionist’ state, seeking to undermine existing institutions and create competing ones, or a 
‘status-quo’ state, seeking to preserve existing institutions and establish complementary new 
ones. Realists have generally argued for Chinese revisionism and liberals for Chinese 
integrationism, while constructivists and English School authors can be found on either side of 
the argument. All, however, have noted evidence for both tendencies in China’s global 
governance engagements. Yet, IR scholars have thus far not modified their frameworks to 
explain contradictory evidence. 
 Realists see rising powers as naturally revisionist, though the extent to which they 
pursue their revisionist intentions may vary (Buzan, 2010). This is based on their assumption 
that as states become stronger they will chafe against the limitations on their power posed by 
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the existing great powers. The latter are also likely to become increasingly concerned about 
their rivals and act to restrain their rise. This produces a situation in which conflict between the 
great powers is increasingly possible, according to defensive realists (Kirshner, 2010), or 
practically inevitable, according to offensive realists and power transition theorists 
(Mearsheimer, 2014; Kennedy, 1988; Gilpin, 1981). Realists’ ‘zero-sum’ understanding of 
national power means that they see global governance institutions as merely tools in the hands 
of powerful states pursuing their national interest, or at most as a site of struggle between them 
(Mearsheimer, 1994). In turn, international institutions’ power over weaker states is not 
autonomous but stems from the great powers’ agency (Drezner, 2008). Realists’ dismissal of 
global governance is not surprising since, as Beeson and Zeng (2018, p. 2) argue, it is ‘a 
predominantly liberal world view and discourse’.  
Consequently, it is also not surprising that realists have produced a relatively small 
literature dedicated to examining Chinese engagement in global governance. Indeed, realists 
have viewed China’s engagement in global governance as part of its broader strategy to contest, 
and ultimately supplant, US power. In the typical realist narrative, China historically preferred 
to ‘free-ride’ on existing institutions, as they benefited its economic development, but as its 
power has grown it has become more assertive in global governance arenas, promoting its 
interests and delegitimising US leadership (Schweller & Pu, 2011). This assertiveness is seen 
as strategic and selective, however, limited to areas in which China possesses comparative 
advantage, especially in economic matters, and calibrated not to disrupt beneficial 
arrangements.  
Beeson and Li (2016), for example, argue that constructing alternative international 
institutions is a pillar of China’s ‘grand strategy’, based on emulating US strategy in the 
postwar era. China’s aim, they claim, is to replace the US as a provider of public goods and 
thus draw other countries away from the American orbit. James Paradise (2016) examines 
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China’s ‘parallel institutions’, like the AIIB, which essentially replicate a function already 
provided by other Western-led institutions. He argues that these institutions indicate that China 
is no longer a ‘status quo’ power, if that means subscription or supplication to a Western-led 
system. Schweller and Pu (2011) argue that under the historically unprecedented condition of 
unipolarity, any attempt to limit US dominance will be read as ‘unlimited-aims’ revisionism. 
Therefore, aspiring great powers have little choice but to first delegitimise the existing US-led 
order and its global governance institutions, which is what China appears to be currently 
attempting.  
Liberal IR theories have paid far greater attention to global governance than their realist 
counterparts. Indeed, the origins of the global governance literature are in the 1980s’ neoliberal 
scholarship on international regimes (Sinclair, 2012). Neoliberal institutionalists have argued 
that international institutions are a key means of overcoming the problem of cooperation under 
anarchy in international relations (Keohane, 1984; Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). 
Institutionalisation reinforces cooperation and deepens shared interests among states, thus 
reducing the risk of violent conflict, as states acting rationally will seek to preserve institutions 
that benefit them.  
Accordingly, Ikenberry (2008) has argued that since China has greatly benefited from 
the liberal international order, it will broadly preserve its core institutions as it becomes 
stronger. Likewise, Miles Kahler (2013, p. 712) claims:  
[T]he impact of the large emerging economies on global governance is unlikely 
to be revolutionary. They do not differ from other powers, past and present, in 
wishing to extract as many benefits as possible from their engagement with the 
international order while giving up as little decision-making autonomy as 
possible.  
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Looking at the new institutions established by China, Ikenberry and Lim (2017) contend they 
are unlikely to undermine the existing set of liberal international institutions. In fact, they argue 
that China’s multilateral initiatives militate against counter-hegemonic behaviour, as they 
require buy-in from other states. Similarly, several authors have examined the AIIB, arguably 
the most important new institution established by China, and have found that it does not 
threaten the international liberal status quo (Wilson, 2017; Gu, 2017; Chin, 2016). 
Corroborating Ikenberry and Lim’s argument, Wilson (2017) has found evidence that 
traditional donor participation in the AIIB has made it more status quo than originally intended.  
Alongside rationalism, a sizable constructivist and English School scholarship has also 
emerged. Constructivists have examined Chinese engagements in global governance through 
the lenses of socialisation, identity, and norms, with some reaching revisionist, and others 
status quo, conclusions. Earlier scholarship noted the socialising effects of Chinese 
engagement in international institutions on China’s international behaviour (Johnston, 2008). 
Beverly Loke (2017) has argued, however, that socialisation is now a two-way process, with 
China acting as both norm-taker and norm-maker, suggesting binary accounts of China, as 
either revisionist or integrationist, are problematic. She argues that active engagement in global 
governance has, however, become critical to China’s identity and its positioning within the 
international order. Amitav Acharya (2011), on the other hand, sees rising powers’ leadership 
aspirations in global governance to be limited by their normative commitment to non-
interference, which stems from their colonial histories. Larson (2015) uses Social Identity 
Theory to examine China’s developing identity as a great power. She argues that Chinese 
identity manifests a ‘social creativity’ strategy, whereby an aspiring great power avoids direct 
competition with, or emulating, leading states, instead focusing on developing its own strengths 
and attaining pre-eminence in different areas of global governance. This means China’s rise 
need not be ‘zero-sum’ with US power. Pu (2017, p. 139), meanwhile, focuses on China’s 
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confused identity and ‘status signalling’ – is China a ‘socialist country with Chinese 
characteristics’; a developing country; a rising power; a great power; or an Asian regional 
power? These mixed signals, he argues, reflect confusion in China about its own identity, as 
well as growing expectations and suspicion regarding China’s global governance role 
internationally.  
Practically all studies of Chinese engagement in global governance are aware that actual 
behaviour displays both apparently revisionist and status quo tendencies. Realists and liberal 
institutionalists alike explain inconsistencies in their argument as stemming from Chinese 
leaders’ strategic calculations. But their understanding of leaders’ calculus is based on little 
more than the basic assumptions of their theories regarding international relations – whether 
they view relations between states as inherently ‘zero-sum’ or as potentially mutually 
beneficial. Realist studies view examples of Chinese status quo behaviour as China ‘biding its 
time’, waiting for its power to grow before attempting a more significant challenge to US 
dominance. Thus, Fareed Zakaria (2014), argues in relation to the BRI and AIIB: ‘China has 
begun a patient, low-key but persistent campaign to propose alternatives to the existing 
structure of international arrangements in Asia and beyond. There are those in Beijing who 
want to move from being anti-American to post-American’.  
Liberals have also pointed out the selective and strategic, even instrumental, nature of 
China’s engagement in global governance to-date (Lye, 2017; Wouters & Burnay, 2012; 
Shambaugh, 2013; Li, 2011; Gu, 2017). Wouters and Burnay (2012), for example, argue that 
although instrumental calculations are the primary driver of Chinese engagement with 
multilateral institutions, China’s increased engagement with the WTO dispute resolution 
mechanism shows the success of the process of its integration into existing global governance 
mechanisms. Likewise, Shambaugh (2013) also describes China’s disposition as ‘selective 
multilateral’, and while noting its rejection of Western liberal norms, he nonetheless argues 
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that China is almost fully integrated into the international institutional architecture. Liberal 
studies of selective Chinese engagement, much like their realist counterparts, emphasise the 
strategic nature of this selectivity, as China seeks to maximise benefits from global governance 
platforms. They differ, however, in their expectation that rather than undermine the liberal 
international order, this benefit-maximising approach will likely reinforce it. Most famously, 
Ikenberry (2008) has argued that the international liberal order can survive the decline of 
American hegemony, because it is so beneficial to China and other rising powers. These 
conclusions are based on a different theorising of international politics, not on the availability 
of different evidence than the realists possess.  
To be sure, not all liberals are optimistic about the preservation of the global 
governance status quo. This is especially true for those who view domestic characteristics, such 
as regime type or values, as shaping international behaviour. Jessica Weiss (2013), for 
example, argues that the patriotic education campaign the CCP launched in the 1990s has 
entrenched a virulent nationalism among the wider Chinese population that now constrains 
China’s foreign policy choices and channels them in more aggressive directions. Others point 
to the relationship between China’s growing domestic economic challenges and its more 
assertive posture internationally (Krolikowski, 2017). Haggard (2014) also questions the 
veracity of the institutionalist and interdependence arguments. Growing rising power 
recalcitrance in international institutions suggests cooperation is becoming harder to attain, 
while the liberal interdependence thesis ignores the prospects for Chinese efforts to reduce its 
economic dependence on the US, or indeed, as we have recently seen, the possibility of 
American efforts to reduce economic interdependence with China. Nonetheless, ‘pessimistic’ 
liberal accounts still struggle to systematically explain evidence for both revisionist and status 
quo behaviour.   
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The constructivist and English School scholarship is somewhat distinct from the 
rationalist accounts in that it does not view Chinese engagement in global governance as 
necessarily stemming from strategic calculation, though it continues to see China as a unitary 
actor. Rather, China’s engagements are seen as products of deeper processes of identity-
formation and socialisation. It is still problematic from within this framework to explain the 
co-existence of revisionist and status-quo behaviours, however. Pu’s (2017) notion of a 
competition between different Chinese identities is one potential explanation, which usefully 
points to possible internal disagreements within China over foreign and security policy-
making. It is not clear from Pu’s analysis, however, why and how different identities are linked 
to particular kinds of international behaviour. Given the high level of variegation in Chinese 
engagements, sometimes even within a single area of policy, we need to adopt a lens capable 
of more precise analysis of the dynamics shaping Chinese engagements than that afforded by 
the notion of competing identities.  
 
State Transformation and Chinese Engagements in Global Governance 
If we forego the assumption that China is a unitary actor in international politics, it is possible 
to make better sense of various Chinese engagements in global governance and transcend the 
debate’s current impasse. In this section, we draw on the approach elaborated by Lee Jones 
(2018) for studying rising powers’ foreign and security policies under conditions of state 
transformation to explain China’s complex interactions with global governance.  
Two interrelated aspects of the shift towards ‘post-Westphalian’ statehood are 
particularly pertinent: First, administrative reforms designed to spur market-led development 
have often fragmented policymaking processes, producing more diffuse, networked, 
multiscalar and multi-actor forms of governance, which replace or complement more 
hierarchical forms of government in many states (e.g. Rhodes, 1997). Second, under 
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globalisation the assumed separation of domestic and international politics has blurred, such 
that the fragmentation of policymaking and implementation is also manifesting internationally. 
Whereas foreign policymaking was conventionally the domain of a small number of elite actors 
– top leaders, diplomats, and generals – increasingly, a growing number of hitherto 
domestically focused or newly established agencies have come to operate internationally, or 
make policy with international consequences. These include regulators, police agencies, state-
owned companies, subnational governments and others. 
The IR literature on rising powers has tended to ignore these insights, or see them as 
irrelevant for rising powers, like China (see Hameiri and Jones, 2016). IR accounts have often 
been constrained by the ‘territorial trap’ – the tendency to view the national territory as a natural 
container for social and political processes (Agnew, 1994), often as a ‘black box’ (Glassman, 
2010). Hence, they often ignore what happens inside China when evaluating Chinese 
international actions, under the assumption that states’ international behaviour is shaped mainly 
by international systemic pressures. Alternatively, some IR scholars argue that domestic 
politics shapes states’ international behaviour in a ‘two-step’ process or ‘two-level game’, thus 
notionally accounting for domestic processes but preserving the demarcation of domestic and 
international political arenas (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999; Putnam, 1988; cf. Go & Lawson 
2017). Similarly, the subfields of Foreign Policy Analysis and ‘bureaucratic politics’ have 
continued to focus on traditional foreign policymaking bureaucracies, affording limited 
attention to how globalisation has transformed foreign policymaking and implementation 
processes (see Jones, 2018). 
In proximate fields, however, there are now decades of research on new modes of 
governance and ‘post-Westphalian’ statehood. To be sure, the notion that any state has ever 
truly approximated the Weberian hierarchical ideal or been a hermetically sealed ‘container’ 
on social and political processes has always been a myth. Yet, this idea was closer to empirical 
 15 
reality during the decades immediately after World War II, when the concentration of power, 
authority and resources in the national scale had reached its apogee (Agnew, 2009; Jessop, 
2009). Since the onset of globalisation, however, the distance between the myth of nation-
statehood and reality has been growing all over the world, albeit unevenly, and China is no 
different (Agnew, 2009; Hameiri & Jones, 2015; 2016).  
One of the chief insights of the literature on new forms of statehood is the shift from 
top-down, hierarchical models towards ‘regulatory statehood’. In regulatory states, core 
executives no longer determine policymaking and implementation via ‘command and control’ 
processes but rather set broad targets and guidelines to shape the behaviour of a wide range of 
quasi-autonomous national, subnational, and private bodies to follow (Majone, 1994; Dubash 
& Morgan, 2013). This has had significant consequences for foreign and security policymaking 
and for international relations, as many hitherto domestically oriented agencies have developed 
their own international policies, breaking the monopoly of foreign and defence ministries (Hill, 
2016; Jayasuriya, 2001). Alongside traditional diplomacy and summits, we have seen the 
emergence of many transgovernmental networks and multilevel governance arrangements to 
manage transnational flows and problems. These modes of governance reflect and further 
propel changes in the ways that states are internally structured, and interact with each other 
(Slaughter, 2004; Cerny, 2010). As mentioned, IR scholars have variously ignored these 
processes, view rising powers like China as excluded from them, or claim that rising powers 
are reversing earlier trends, leading the world ‘back to Westphalia’ (Flemes, 2013, pp. 1016–
17).  
 By contrast, China specialists have been keenly aware of transformation in the Chinese 
party-state over recent decades. Under Mao, foreign policymaking was tightly controlled by 
top leaders, while China’s autarkic economy helped direct relations and activities inwards. 
Since the onset of capitalist ‘reform’ in 1978, however, Sinologists have documented the 
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fragmentation of policy regimes and pluralisation of agency through endless and going changes 
to central ministries and agencies and to party-state relations (Leiberthal, 1992; Mertha, 2009; 
Andrews-Speed, 2010), and the decentralisation of authority to sub-national governments 
(Zheng 2007). Many IR scholars continue to treat leaders’ authority as absolute. In reality, 
however, top leaders in the CCP often do not control policy implementation and outcomes 
directly, but rather seek to shape the conduct of other actors within the wider party-state 
through regulatory mechanisms. This primarily involves issuing broad guidelines for policy 
and establishing coordinating mechanisms, like ‘leading small groups’ (LSGs), in the politburo 
or State Council to coordinate the activities of diverse actors, or more recently via 
Commissions in the Central Party Committees (Jones, 2018). In turn, subordinates engage 
policymaking and implementation via one, or more, of the ‘three Is’ – influencing, interpreting 
and ignoring (Jones 2018).  
Many recent major policies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), operate in this 
way. Leaders’ statements contain little detail beyond headline aspirations. Subordinate 
agencies seek to influence policy directions by lobbying top leaders and central agencies. The 
vagueness of top leaders’ statements provides them with considerable scope to interpret 
leaders’ intentions, often in ways that suit their sectional agendas. More rarely, some even 
ignore vague central guidelines to pursue their own interests (Jones and Zeng, 2019; Zeng, 
2019a; Holbig, 2004; Van Aken & Lewis, 2015). During the tenure of Xi Jinping’s predecessor 
Hu Jintao, this ineffective central governance was reflected in the popular Chinese saying that 
‘government decree does not travel outside Zhongnanhai [the CCP’s central headquarters]’. It 
is precisely because of this ineffective central governance that Xi Jinping has launched a series 
of significant reforms trying to centralise political power and strengthen the authority of the 
top party leadership. Nonetheless, those efforts are still unable to fully eliminate the 
fragmentation of the Chinese political system (Jones & Zeng, 2019).  
 17 
Increasingly, some Sinologists have recognised the implications of China’s fragmented 
party-state for its foreign and security policymaking and implementation, including the 
growing international footprint of China’s SOEs, regulators, and provincial governments, 
which operate internationally with considerable latitude (Jones & Zou, 2017; Bell & Feng, 
2013; Chen & Jian, 2009; Chen, Jian, & Chen, 2010). Although they rarely engage in IR 
debates and IR scholars tend to ignore their findings, the evidence Sinologists provide suggests 
China is not immune from ‘post-Westphalian’ transformation, including under ‘strongman’ Xi 
(Jakobson & Manuel 2016). The top party leadership is clearly aware of the problems 
associated with the fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation of China’s foreign 
policymaking and implementation. In the latest party-state restructuring in March 2018, a new 
coordinating mechanism, the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Central Party Committee, was 
announced. In the Commission’s first meeting on 16 May 2018, President Xi called for 
‘enhancing the centralized and unified leadership of the CPC [Chinese Communist Party] 
Central Committee over foreign affairs’ (Xinhua, 2018). This statement only makes sense by 
reference to the historically fragmented nature of foreign policymaking and implementation in 
China. The extent to which the top leadership can successfully centralise policymaking is 
uncertain, however.  
To be sure, senior leaders retain important and powerful mechanisms to rein in 
subordinate actors that stray too far from their intended policies, or which produce adverse 
outcomes (Jones, 2018). They can discipline or purge cadres, issue tighter guidelines, and 
recentralise authority. Purges of junior and some senior cadres have intensified since Xi came 
to power (Jones & Zou, 2017, pp. 754–5). Senior leaders’ coordination mechanisms can never 
fully eliminate the problems associated with the party-state’s fragmentation, decentralisation 
and internationalisation, however, manifesting in poor implementation of core Xi policies, for 
example on environmental protection in China (The Economist, 2016). As a result, the process 
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of policymaking and implementation can often generate outcomes that were not foreseen or 
desired by centrally located actors or top leaders, prompting attempts to rein in other agencies, 
clarify guidelines, or recentralise authority. The actual output of Chinese foreign and security 
policy, then, is shaped by this ongoing ‘tug of war’ between actors within the transformed 
party-state, which has no decisive resolution (Jones, 2018).  
While the discussion above describes the general attributes of the Chinese party-state, 
the dynamics of particular policy domains may be dissimilar, owing to the different 
constellations of actors and interests. Some policy areas manifest relatively low levels of 
pluralisation, with only a handful of agencies involved in policymaking and implementation, 
while others exhibit very high levels of pluralisation, with literally hundreds of agencies and 
SOEs involved (the BRI is a clear example). The degree of pluralisation in the policy-making 
and implementation processes is important, as the involvement of many actors naturally makes 
coordination and coherence more difficult than in situations where fewer actors are included. 
This is particularly the case in market or heterarchical governance arrangements, in which clear 
relations of authority are absent (see Rhodes, 1997; Pierre & Peters, 2005; Jessop, 1998). 
Indeed, in China it is common for multiple functional ministries and agencies to govern the 
same policy domain with fuzzy demarcation of responsibilities and authority, as we will show 
in the case of nuclear governance.  
But state transformation does not merely throw up technocratic problems of steering 
and coordination – it is first and foremost a political process, shaped by power relations. The 
existence of significant social, political and ideological cleavages in China is masked by the 
appearance of top-down CCP rule and the, somewhat ironic, elimination of almost all 
references to class and class conflict in the notionally Marxist-Leninist party’s official 
discourse from the 1980s (So, 2013). Instead of a powerful and independent bourgeoisie 
driving capitalist transformations, the CCP has remained central to China’s capitalist economy, 
 19 
not only through the still-significant state sector, but also through the incorporation of the 
emerging capitalist class, via Jiang Zemin’s ‘three represents’, following the economic reforms 
of the late 1970s (Fewsmith, 2003). Consequently, struggles over state transformation in China 
often manifest within the party-state either through factional struggles or bureaucratic politics.  
One example is the relationship between provinces. To promote economic growth, 
China’s provincial governments were in the 1980s given responsibility for provincial economic 
development, as well as considerable scope to pursue foreign economic relations. 
Consequently, provinces were in the 1990s described as ‘duke economies’, better integrated 
into regional and international value chains than with each other (Goodman & Segal, 1994). 
This situation largely persists today. Provinces compete with each other fiercely over funding 
from Beijing, investment opportunities and foreign contracts, and play a significant role in 
shaping Chinese foreign policy through their lobbying of the central government and direct 
engagements abroad (Wong, 2018; Jian, et al., 2010; Cheung & Tang, 2001). Likewise, the 
country’s remaining national and provincial SOEs have been corporatised in the 1990s and 
also compete hard for contracts and projects (Jones & Zou, 2017).  
Central Beijing agencies are known to struggle over turf and often over the overall 
direction of policy, which to be sure is hardly unusual in bureaucratic settings (e.g. Allison and 
Halperin, 1972). These struggles often reflect, however, significant socio-political divisions 
associated with the country’s economic transformations of the past few decades. For example, 
the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has been a staunch supporter of renminbi 
internationalisation, as part of its broader, ideologically driven, push to liberalise the Chinese 
economy (He, 2015). Under current circumstances in the global economy, currency 
internationalisation can only truly take off when the currency-issuing economy generates 
global demand by running trade, current account and/or balance of payments deficits. China’s 
political economy, however, is ‘structurally biased towards the creation of overcapacity and 
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excess exports’ (Germain & Schwartz, 2017, p. 782). Renminbi internationalisation has thus 
faced stiff resistance from the National Development and Reform Commission, local 
governments, the real estate and construction industries, as well as exporting firms and SOEs 
(He, 2015). These interests benefit not only from lower exchange rates but primarily from a 
repressed financial system funnelling household savings into cheap credit for international 
expansion (Germain & Schwartz, 2017; McNally, 2015). Consequently, despite apparent 
support from the top leadership, renminbi internationalisation has proceeded slowly.  
As we can see, the divergence of interests within the party-state carries serious 
implications for policy choices and their outcomes. State transformation has internationalised 
this process. It is no longer satisfactory to assume that disagreements over policy directions are 
worked out internally to produce a unified national position on particular issues. Rather, as 
more agencies now act internationally quasi-autonomously, China’s international behaviour 
often reflects different positions and agendas.  
We now proceed to describe how state transformation has shaped China’s engagements 
with the global governance of nuclear technologies. This is an apparently hard test-case, given 
it is arguably the clearest ‘hard security’ domain, where IR scholars typically expect 
centralised, top-down controls and high-level strategic direction to persist, even as other 
domains fragment and pluralise (e.g. Keohane & Nye, 2012). Here too, however, we find that 
foregrounding state transformation dynamics, especially bureaucratic inter-departmental 
struggles and the activities of lightly regulated nuclear SOEs, helps explain the apparent co-
existence of revisionist and status quo Chinese behaviours internationally.   
 
China and Global Nuclear Governance 
China has been a key player in shaping the global nuclear order from the creation of this order 
(1945-1970s), its consolidation (1980s-90s) and current period of maintenance and uncertainty 
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(Horsburgh, 2015). Yet, China’s attitude towards global nuclear governance has significantly 
shifted, transiting from an outsider to an insider in the past few decades (Zhou, 2003). Between 
1964 (when China tested its first nuclear device) and 1983, China was mainly critical of the 
international treaties on nuclear governance and thus had maintained minimum participation 
with key nuclear institutions. After Mao Zedong passed away, Deng Xiaoping’s reform and 
opening up agenda encouraged China to ‘join the world’. On the nuclear governance front, 
China increased its engagement with global institutions but still remained a passive and partial 
participant from 1983 to 1992. However, since China joined the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, it has shifted to active and full participation in global nuclear 
governance regimes. All of those factors have moved China’s nuclear governance towards the 
‘post-Westphalian’ statehood. Consequently, we mainly focus on this era of Chinese 
participation in global nuclear governance in the late 1990s and the 2000s and analyse how 
state transformation has shaped Chinese engagement with the global nuclear order.  
 China’s behaviour in global nuclear governance is clearly inconsistent. On the one hand, 
regarding nuclear non-proliferation, for example, China has become increasingly willing to 
improve and clarify its commitments, as demonstrated by its participation in the NPT and 
CTBT (Yuan, 2002). Furthermore, notwithstanding their actual impact, China has taken a 
leadership role in hosting the Six Party Talks to deal with North Korea’s nuclearisation, in 
order to defend non-proliferation. On the other hand, China’s transfer of nuclear technologies 
and exports of nuclear goods to Iran and Pakistan have been widely denounced as proliferation 
activities (Kan, 2015; Stewart, 2015). Chinese actions – including: opposition to the 
Proliferation Security Initiative; inaction to ratify the CTBT; limited cooperation in 
negotiations relating to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; caution, even opposition, towards 
intensifying sanctions against Iran and North Korea – have also undermined global, and its 
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own government’s, efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Thus, some have argued that 
there is a gap between China’s words and deeds and questioned the sincerity of China’s nuclear 
commitments (Yuan, 2002). 
Chinese behaviours in global nuclear governance provide evidence for both revisionist 
and status quo arguments, such that identifying a clear orientation is difficult, as Johnston (2013) 
recognises. As we have seen, this situation is in fact common across issue-areas and policy 
domains in China. Explanations for the co-existence of both tendencies have either drawn on 
constructivist frameworks emphasising China’s shifting identity or focused on conflicts 
between domestic actors. Following the constructivist approach, Zhou Baogen (2003), for 
example, has explained China’s increased cooperation with global nuclear governance as 
relating to the transformation of state identity from ‘special nuclear state’ to ‘normal nuclear 
state’, such that China has come to gradually identify its interests with other nuclear states.  Li 
Shaojun (2001) has pointed to the impact of China’s unique strategic cultural traditions, which 
are said to distinguish Chinese actions from Western nuclear states. These studies treat China 
as a unitary actor, however, and hence struggle to explain the co-existence of revisionist and 
status quo behaviours at the same time, as opposed to in different historical moments.  
More helpful are explanations that pay attention to Chinese domestic politics, on which 
we draw to make our own argument (Gill & Medeiros, 2000; Medeiros, 2007; Swaine & 
Johnston, 1999; Horsburgh, 2015; Kent, 2007; Lewis, 2007; Foot & Walter, 2011). While 
offering many useful insights, these studies often retain a ‘two-step’ analysis and thus see 
domestic struggles as leading to the formation of a unified foreign policy. Although several 
studies note that Chinese nuclear companies have operated abroad without Beijing’s 
knowledge, our state transformation approach locates such instances and behaviours within the 
context of China’s wider transformative processes of the past several decades, and thus 
identifies their significance for IR debates over China’s engagement in global governance. 
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State transformation and China’s Engagement in Global Nuclear Governance 
In the early 1980s, China’s limited participation in global nuclear regimes and simple arms 
control policy required little bureaucratic expertise on arms control and disarmament. The 
relevant policymaking was primarily handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) 
International Organization Department (Swaine and Johnston, 1999). As Swaine and Johnston 
(1999, p. 115) point out ‘the job was a relatively easy one – criticize the United States and 
Soviet Union and stick to vague and impractical proposals’. Since, several key factors have 
transformed decision-making and implementation from a centralised towards a more diffuse 
process, thus producing inconsistent behaviour. 
First, the increasingly technical nature of the global nuclear agenda has brought more 
actors into China’s domestic decision-making process, making it more fragmented and 
pluralized. From the mid-1980s, the arms control agenda has expanded to include test bans, 
nuclear winters, and chemical weapons issues, generating a growing need for technical 
expertise. The MFA was thus forced to work with experts, based in a wide range of institutions, 
including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the China Academy of Engineering Physics, 
the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence and the Institute 
of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, as well as seismological and chemical 
experts (Swaine and Johnston, 1999). These actors’ interests have not necessarily been 
commensurate with the MFA’s, and their technical concerns have often conflicted with its 
diplomatic agenda. For example, in the internal debate on whether China should sign the CTBT 
in late 1990s, the military-technical voice, led by the PLA, raised concerns about the Treaty’s 
negative impact on China’s nuclear deterrence and future development of its nuclear 
technology, while the MFA strongly advocated signing the Treaty for the sake of diplomatic 
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interests (i.e. improving China’s national image on the international stage in this case), despite 
the military concern (Gill & Medeiros, 2000).  
As the increasingly technical global nuclear agenda moved closer to the PLA’s areas of 
expertise and competencies, the MFA’s limited expertise restricted its capacity to ‘argue about 
the technical merits of an agreement or process’ (Gill & Medeiros, 2000; Fravel & Medeiros, 
2010; Johnston, 2013, p. 116). Given the general paucity of military-technical expertise on 
nuclear issues within China (Fravel & Medeiros, 2010), the PLA’s influence has expanded 
through its intellectual power. A significant number of scientific institutions and strategic 
research organisations are directly associated, or have close ties with, the PLA, including the 
General Staff Department, General Armaments Department (restructured as Equipment 
Development Department of the Central Military Commission in 2016) and the Academy of 
Military Sciences. China’s military-technical community has often leveraged its expertise to 
advance its preferred position and reject alternatives, as reflected in its role obstructing China’s 
ratifying of the CTBT (Swaine, 1999, p. 117-8).  
Second, China’s expanding arms control and nuclear non-proliferation community has 
over time developed direct links with foreign governments and international agencies. As 
China has become a more active participant in global nuclear regimes since the 1990s, Chinese 
agencies have engaged with the international nuclear policy community via funding, 
international conferences and exchange of research ideas. Evidence shows that those contacts 
did have an impact on Chinese decisions regarding how to engage global nuclear treaties such 
as NPT, CTBT and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (Swaine, 1999; Gill and Medeiros, 2000; 
Medeiros, 2007). Thus, many security experts consider official and unofficial contacts with 
China’s academic and policy community as a viable way to influence China’s nuclear policy 
(Swaine, 1999; Gill and Medeiros, 2000). Yet, state transformation dynamics mean that 
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influencing one Chinese agency does not necessarily indicate changing the entire policymaking 
and implementation apparatus’ outlook.  
Third, China’s market reform has played a key role in transforming Chinese nuclear 
policymaking and implementation processes. From the 1980s, Chinese military spending was 
deprioritised as resources were focused on promoting domestic economic development, 
leading to a steep decline in the Chinese defence budget. According to World Bank data, 
Chinese military expenditure declined from around 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product in 
1989 to only 1.67 per cent in 1997 (World Bank, n.d). As a leading Chinese nuclear expert 
describes, ‘during this period, China’s national defence industries experienced severe pressure 
to survive’ (Fan, 2016, p. 206). The financial austerity forced China’s defence industry to raise 
its own funds through exports of nuclear materials, and the expansion of civilian use of nuclear 
power, within and outside China. These activities have often not been coordinated with China’s 
diplomatic efforts and have in some cases been seen to undermine the global non-proliferation 
agenda.  
Since China’s military technology was uncompetitive at the time, in an already 
established international nuclear market, the Chinese defence industry had to explore selling 
to countries with poor relations with the West (Fan, 2016, p. 203). This kind of nuclear trade 
has been often criticised as proliferation activities, producing international backlash that the 
MFA has had to reluctantly manage. For example, while China’s transfer of technology to Iran 
generated income for the defence industry, the MFA was forced to manage international 
denouncements and sanctions, especially from the US (Gill & Medeiros, 2000). Thus, China’s 
diplomatic and PLA/defence communities were again pitted against each other, with the latter’s 
commercial interests ultimately trumping the MFA’s diplomatic agenda (Gill & Medeiros, 
2000; Medeiros, 2007).  
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Reflecting China’s wider transformation and marketisation processes, the trade in 
nuclear materials has also been affected by other commercial interests within the party-state. 
In the case of Iran, for example, the involvement of the Chinese energy industry has been 
crucial. As Iran became a key oil supplier to China, the large and powerful Chinese national 
oil companies have invested extensively in Iranian energy resources. Again, China’s energy 
companies had entered a market dominated by Western rivals and were therefore willing to 
work in riskier political environments, such as in Iran, Sudan and Venezuela. Their 
involvement has undermined international sanctions, testing China’s official diplomatic 
commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.   
China’s defence industry has also heavily promoted the military-to-civilian conversion 
of Chinese nuclear technologies (Gill and Medeiros, 2000; Fan, 2016). This led to the rapid 
development of China’s civilian nuclear industry, intensifying the already significant problems 
of managing nuclear security and exports of nuclear materials. The governance of civilian 
nuclear technologies in China is highly fragmented. The civilian nuclear industry is primarily 
regulated by the China Energy Administration, under the National Development and Reform 
Commission, and the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National 
Defence, under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. Yet, relevant governing 
responsibilities also reside in the Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Public 
Security, Ministry of Heath, Ministry of Land and Resources,  Ministry of Energy, Ministry of 
Communications and the General Administration of Customs and Civil Aviation 
Administration (Li et al., 2012, pp. 10-14). As mentioned, such fragmentation and overlap are 
not unique to nuclear issues, but common in the Chinese party-state (Hameiri & Jones, 2016). 
According to the report of the Natural Resources Defence Council:  
Compared with other major nuclear power, the management structure of the Chinese 
nuclear industry is more complex. It regularly throws up problems such as unclear and 
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overlapping division of duties and low management efficiency…The nuclear security 
supervision is also not centralised and effectively managed. For example, the civilian use 
of nuclear facilities is supervised by the National Nuclear Safety Administration under 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection, while military nuclear facilities are supervised 
by the Department of National Defence, Science and Engineering, under the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology. This not only makes it impossible to secure 
independence, but also renders the already limited supervision and technical resources 
more decentralized (Li et. al, 2012, p. 11). 
This fragmented governance system has made supervision and law-enforcement quite 
difficult, providing room for Chinese state-owned and private companies to export both licit 
and illicit nuclear materials. For example, when a Chinese nuclear company’s magnet sale to a 
Pakistan research lab raised US concerns about its function in late 1990s, MFA officials 
privately acknowledged that they had no prior knowledge of this deal (Medeiros, 2007). 
Additionally, China’s law enforcement authorities typically lack political capacity and, often, 
will to regulate the exports of nuclear materials and technologies unless significant forces 
intervene to change the political balance.  
For example, in 2016, the local Chinese Public Security Department in Dandong 
announced it would investigate Hongxiang Industrial Development Corporation for ‘grave 
economic crimes during trading activities’ with North Korea after the Chinese government 
faced considerable pressure from the US Department of Justice (Perlez & Buckley, 2016). As 
a ‘commercial empire accounting for a fifth of trade’ between China and North Korea (Myers, 
2018), Hongxiang was believed to be involved in smuggling nuclear materials to North Korea 
(Perlez & Buckley, 2016; Thompson, 2016). Hongxiang’s trade activities with North Korea 
were apparently known to local authorities who lacked motivation to regulate them, not only 
because of Hongxiang’s contributions to the local economy, but also due to the sophisticated 
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political network the company had built. Hongxiang’s owner, Ma Xiaohong, was selected as a 
delegate to the provincial People’s Congress and was recognised by Dandong authorities as 
one of the city’s top ten outstanding women, suggesting she was highly valued by the local 
government. Many similar stories, of Chinese nuclear companies trading with North Korea, 
Pakistan and Iran, have been reported, raising ‘questions about Beijing’s ability to monitor the 
actions of its nuclear enterprises’ (Medeiros, 2007, p. 66).  
Above factors reflect the aforementioned shift towards ‘post-Westphalian’ statehood in 
the domain of China’s nuclear governance. The introduction of market reform in China’s 
nuclear industry combined the corresponding administrative reforms have fragmented and 
diffused the original hierarchical forms of nuclear governance in China. In the meanwhile, 
China’s participation in global governance – from joining global nuclear regimes, signing 
global nuclear treaties to exchange knowledge of nuclear governance at global stages - has 
blurred the line between domestic and international nuclear governance. Consequently, the 
decision-making has been shifted from a relatively small group of military and diplomatic elites 
in Beijing to a wide range of domestic and international stakeholders including SOEs, global 
nuclear regimes, academic and policy community of nuclear technologies, and various local 
and central civilian authority in China.  
Nonetheless, we are not suggesting that China’s nuclear governance is the same with 
that of Western states. After all, there are obvious notable difference – the omnipresent role of 
the state. In the wider context, this situates in the difference between Chinese and Western 
approach to global governance (Zeng 2019b; Zeng, Stevens & Chen 2017). In the Western 
democratic context, the rise of neoliberalism, NGOs and civil society has made non-state actors 
a key force of governance. As such, a key theme of governance in the Western context is 
“governance without government” (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). However, such neoliberal 
imperatives are at odds in the Chinese context. In nuclear governance more specially, nuclear 
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NGOs such as anti-nuclear organizations and Arm Control Association that play a significant 
role in the West are quite irrelevant in China. Chinese media is subject to strict censorship 
when it comes to high politics and national security matters such as nuclear technology. As we 
will discuss later, China’s Atomic Energy Law is unable to pass due to disagreement within 
the state not between the state and society or legislative power. This is obviously different in 
the Western liberal democratic societies, in which elected legislators and social power are 
crucial in deciding and supervising those matters.  
While state transformation and global capitalism has not changed the nature of China’s 
nuclear governance i.e. the strict state controlled industry, this does not mean that we can ignore 
the shift of nuclear governance in China. As this paper shows, there are enormous changes in 
the operation of China’s nuclear industry and decision-making mechanism. While the control 
of the state remains, the fragmented state interests and bureaucracy has made China’s nuclear 
governance more complicated than ever before. In facing such complicated governance 
challenges, China has launched waves of administrative reforms in nuclear front but yet to 
prove its success.    
 
Bureaucratic Fragmentation and China’s Atomic Energy Law 
The highly fragmented, decentralised, and often ineffectual mode of governance we describe 
is widely recognised in China. Chinese media reports and academic studies has frequently 
described it as manifesting ‘unclear division of responsibilities’, ‘overlapping of 
responsibilities’ and ‘low management efficiency’. It is also widely acknowledged in China 
that conflicting departmental interests are the principal obstacle to reforming this problematic 
governance system. This has resulted in periodic institutional reforms, which have thus far 
been unable to resolve problems of coordination and regulation in the nuclear sector.  
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One particularly instructive example is the prolonged, and to-date unsuccessful, attempt 
to develop an appropriate legal framework for nuclear technologies in China. Although a major 
global nuclear power, China does not even have an Atomic Energy Law – the most elementary 
and fundamental law to regulate the use of nuclear technologies – due to conflicting 
bureaucratic interests.  
As early as 1984, when the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) was 
established, Chinese officials began to prepare a draft of the law. The context of the NNSA’s 
creation is noteworthy, as it reflects the wider dynamics of China’s nuclear governance. In 
1980, China officially joined the Geneva Conference on Disarmament; however, as a late-
comer to global nuclear governance, its bureaucracy’s shortcomings were quickly exposed as 
existing institutional arrangements were unsuited to engage the various international treaties 
and fora that China had previously ignored (Horsburgh, 2015). Later, in 1984, when China 
joined the International Atomic Energy Agency, the NNSA was created in response to China’s 
membership of international institutions. The NNSA’s establishment was also motivated by 
the desire to pursue international economic opportunities in the nuclear domain. In late 1980s, 
the Chinese government sought to sign several bilateral trade deals (including with the US) and 
thus considered the NSSA useful for improving the credibility of China’s nuclear industry 
(Medeiros, 2007). In reality, the fledgling agency was unable to leverage these circumstances 
to strengthen its status within the Chinese bureaucracy.  
This became clear during the initial drafting of the Atomic Energy Law. The process 
was mainly handled by NNSA, the former Ministry of Nuclear Industry, and the Ministry of 
Public Health. However, as the proposed law touched on the interests of a wide range of 
agencies and SOEs, it generated disagreements and opposition. In the late 1980s, for example, 
the China National Nuclear Corporation and the former Ministry of Energy openly rejected the 
NNSA’s draft version of the law. As the NNSA lacked sufficient influence to coordinate the 
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diverse interests of different departments or overwhelm the opposition, the draft became 
stranded.  
Rapid administrative reshuffles have made the task of drafting and advocating for the 
law even harder. When the NNSA was initially created in 1984, it was governed by China’s 
State Scientific and Technological Commission, but in 1988 it was transferred to the State 
Environmental Protection Administration. The other major law-drafting agency, the Ministry 
of Nuclear Industry, was restructured into the China Nuclear Industry Corporation (中国核工
业总公司) in 1988. This corporation was further restructured into two corporations: the China 
National Nuclear Corporation, and the China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Group 
Corporation Limited, during the institutional reform of the State Council in 1998. At the same 
time, the new Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence was 
created to govern China’s nuclear industry. This commission was restructured into the State 
Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, under the 
governance of the then newly established Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
which was made responsible for governing China’s nuclear industry in 2008. These reshuffles 
have increased confusion over whose role it is to develop the Atomic Energy Law and how to 
implement it. 
That China desperately needs an Atomic Energy Law is held in general consensus 
among China’s academic, media and policy communities. Nonetheless, beyond this basic 
consensus, Chinese bureaucratic actors agree on little else. While many Chinese experts 
continue to call for central coordination from the top (China’s Nuclear News, 2015), some 
blame this endless process on ‘ineffective coordination’ from the top (Feng, 2014). Even 
requests from China’s top leaders have so far failed to break the impasse. In 2014, for example, 
President Xi openly requested to complete the law-making process, but so far with no tangible 
outcomes. It is difficult to conclusively determine why Xi’s orders have not been implemented, 
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but it seems the fragmentation of the policymaking process is a key reason. Recent significant 
reforms of the State Council in March 2018, which again included the amalgamation of 
agencies and ministries, suggest that the problem of poor coordination and fragmentation had, 
at least to that point, not been satisfactorily resolved.  
Finally, this situation undermines the credibility of China’s official rhetoric on the 
international stage. To be sure, we see considerable diversity of national atomic legislation 
frameworks around the world. Yet, as a major nuclear power and the country with the most 
nuclear power plants under construction in the world, the absence of a national Atomic Energy 
Law in China has proven problematic. By contrast, Japan, which does not have nuclear 
weapons, passed its Atomic Energy Basic Law in 1955, and India in 1962. At the 2014 Nuclear 
Security Summit, for example, China’s President Xi Jinping solemnly affirmed his country’s 
progress in enhancing nuclear security and safety and elaborated on China’s approach to 
nuclear security. Xi made a similar pledge to strengthen nuclear security and safety in the 
following Nuclear Security Summit. However, the fact that China has not yet developed a basic 
legal framework to regulate its use of nuclear technologies flies in the face of such public 
pronouncements. Many Chinese experts jokingly call the rapid growth of China’s nuclear 
industry over the past few decades, in the absence of a basic law ordering nuclear governance, 
as akin to ‘streaking’ (China, 2015). Under these legal and regulatory circumstances, 
companies have had considerable liberty to pursue their own commercial interests in ways that 
often undermine official commitments and China’s diplomatic agenda, as we have already seen 
(Zhang, 2019).  
 
Conclusion 
China’s engagement in global governance has been characterised as displaying both 
‘revisionist’ and ‘status quo’ behaviours. Existing accounts in IR struggle to systematically 
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explain this variation, typically interpreting it via the core assumptions of their theories. Thus, 
realists, who presume rising powers are naturally revisionist towards the international order led 
by the current hegemon, see status quo-oriented behaviour as little more than temporary 
accommodation, until Chinese national power grows. Liberals often expect status quo 
behaviour from a China that has benefited from the existing international order handsomely. 
Therefore, revisionist behaviour is interpreted as limited efforts to enhance Chinese influence 
within global governance. Constructivist and English School approaches are less committed to 
these basic positions, but nonetheless continue to attempt uncovering China’s overall 
disposition towards global governance.  
 By contrast, we argue that it is possible to make sense of Chinese actions if we do not 
view China as a unitary actor in international politics. Although often portrayed as the 
quintessential Westphalian state, China has undergone significant processes of fragmentation, 
decentralisation and internationalisation since the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s. 
As a result, in many policy domains we find multiple agencies at various scales participating 
in policymaking and implementation. These agencies’ interests are often at odds and they are 
also often poorly coordinated and/or regulated by central agencies. Since many of these 
agencies are now also active across borders, this results in apparently incoherent Chinese 
international behaviours, manifesting both revisionist and status quo tendencies. Hence, to 
understand China’s orientation towards global governance, it is essential to examine each 
domain separately: the particular composition of actors active in the domain, their interests, 
relationships and capacities to act internationally, and the outcomes of their activities.  
 To demonstrate just how important state transformation is for China’s engagement in 
global governance, we have selected an apparently hard case study – the governance of nuclear 
technologies. Given that nuclear weapons and technologies are seen as matters of ‘high politics’ 
and national security, IR scholars would typically expect tight centralised controls over this 
 34 
domain. By contrast, we have shown that China’s actions, displaying both revisionist and status 
quo tendencies, are best explained by reference to its state transformation processes. Foreign 
policy relating to nuclear matters was until the 1980s controlled by the MFA. From the 1980s, 
however, this arena has vastly expanded leading to less coherent international behaviour. The 
growing complexity of international negotiations has necessitated incorporating new actors, 
many of which are associated with the PLA, such that the MFA rapidly lost its position as the 
expert agency in the Chinese bureaucracy and hence its capacity to shape important policy 
agendas. Chinese agencies have also developed direct relations with international counterparts, 
shaping their outlook and interests. Most importantly, perhaps, the defence establishment’s 
efforts to secure new funding sources has led to the sale of nuclear technologies and materials 
to countries, like Iran and Pakistan, which was widely condemned as proliferation. These 
activities were not coordinated with the MFA and undermined the credibility of China’s official 
stance. Relatedly, the PLA has promoted the development of a civilian nuclear industry in 
China. This industry is regulated poorly by a highly fragmented and decentralised system, 
permitting considerable scope for companies to operate abroad independently in ways that 
cause headaches for Chinese diplomats and leaders (see Zhang, 2019). So fragmented and 
contested is this governance domain that China still lacks a national Atomic Energy Law, 
although it has now been drafted for over three decades and despite exhortations from top 
leaders, including recently Xi Jinping.  
 This study carries significant implications for policymakers outside China. 
Assumptions that Chinese actions necessarily reflect strategic direction from the top leadership 
are, as we have shown, highly problematic. This is especially the case for so-called ‘low politics’ 
domains, like the implementation of the BRI, where thousands of agencies and companies are 
involved. Recent studies find that local and subnational actors have taken advantage of their 
high level of discretion to advance their own agendas in the name of implementing the BRI 
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(Jones and Zeng, 2019; Zeng, 2019a). The fierce regional competition among those actors and 
weakness of central-local coordination suggest that the BRI is far from a coherent, 
geopolitically driven grand strategy. But, as we have seen, ‘high politics’ domains are not free 
from the effects of state transformation processes. It is, therefore, essential to develop fine-
grained analyses of each policy domain, as well as sophisticated ways of engaging Chinese 
agencies that take the dynamics of state transformation into consideration. Not to do this would 
be to risk overreaction and unnecessary conflict.      
 Finally, our insights are not limited to China. Similar processes of state fragmentation, 
decentralisation, and internationalisation, have taken place in other rising power states, 
including India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia and South Africa (see Hameiri et al. 2019). Likewise, 
state transformation processes have been shown to shape the foreign policy making and 
implementation processes of Western states (e.g. Krahmann, 2018). It is time for IR scholars 
to let go of state-centric models and develop perspectives on international politics that do not 
reify a problematic distinction between internal and external dynamics, but which seek to 
directly grapple with recent transformations in statehood and the global political economy.  
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